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ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS FOR NELSON’S LOGIC S
THIAGO NASCIMENTO, UMBERTO RIVIECCIO, JOA˜O MARCOS,
AND MATTHEW SPINKS
Abstract. Besides the better-known Nelson’s Logic and Paraconsistent Nel-
son’s Logic, in “Negation and separation of concepts in constructive systems”
(1959), David Nelson introduced a logic called S with the aim of analyzing the
constructive content of provable negation statements in mathematics. Moti-
vated by results from Kleene, in “On the Interpretation of Intuitionistic Num-
ber Theory” (1945), Nelson investigated a more symmetric recursive definition
of truth, according to which a formula could be either primitively verified or re-
futed. The logic S was defined by means of a calculus lacking the contraction
rule and having infinitely many schematic rules, and no semantics was pro-
vided. This system received little attention from researchers; it even remained
unnoticed that on its original presentation it was inconsistent. Fortunately,
the inconsistency was caused by typos and by a rule whose hypothesis and
conclusion were swapped. We investigate a corrected version of the logic S,
and focus on its propositional fragment, showing that it is algebraizable in
the sense of Blok and Pigozzi (in fact, implicative) with respect to a certain
class of involutive residuated lattices. We thus introduce the first (algebraic)
semantics for S as well as a finite Hilbert-style calculus equivalent to Nelson’s
presentation; we also compare S with the other two above-mentioned logics of
the Nelson family. Our approach is along the same lines of (and partly relies
on) previous algebraic work on Nelson’s logics due to M. Busaniche, R. Cignoli,
S. Odintsov, M. Spinks and R. Veroff.
Introduction
To study the notion of constructible falsity, David Nelson introduced a number of
systems of non-classical logic that combine an intuitionistic approach to truth with
a dual-intuitionistic treatment of falsity. Nelson’s logics (S, N3, and N4) accept
some notable theorems of classical logic, such as ∼∼ϕ⇔ ϕ, while rejecting others,
such as (ϕ ⇒ (ϕ ⇒ ψ)) ⇒ (ϕ ⇒ ψ) and (ϕ ∧ ∼ϕ) ⇒ ψ. Nelson introduced these
logics with the aim of studying constructive proofs in Number Theory. To such
an end, he gave a definition of truth [14, Definition 1] (analogous to Kleene’s [12,
p. 112]) according to which either a formula or its negation should be realized by
some natural number.
Nelson’s logicN3 was introduced in [14] and N4, a paraconsistent version of N3,
was introduced in [1]. N3 is in fact an axiomatic extension of N4 by the axiom1
∼ϕ → (ϕ → ψ). The logic N3 is by now well studied, both via a proof-theoretic
approach and through algebraic methods; in particular, Odintsov [16] proved that
N4 (thus also N3) is algebraizable a` la Blok-Pigozzi [3].
Key words and phrases. Nelson’s logics, Involutive residuated lattices, Algebraic Semantics, Al-
gebraic logic.
1The presence of two implications, the strong one (⇒) mentioned earlier and the weak one (→),
is a distinctive feature of Nelson’s logics; more on this below.
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In [15] Nelson also introduced the logic S, aimed at the study of realizability.
As suggested by L. Humberstone [11, Ch. 8.2, p. 1239–40], the introduction of S
can perhaps also be viewed as an attempt to remedy what some logicians consider
an undesirable feature of N3 (and N4), namely the fact that there are formulas ϕ,
ψ in N3 (and N4) that are mutually interderivable but such that their negations
∼ϕ, ∼ψ fail to be interderivable. It is useful to recall that these two phenomena
are in general disassociated; the latter stems from the failure of the contraposition
law for the so-called weak implication connective → of N3 (and N4), while the
former entails that N3 and N4 are non-congruential (or, as other authors say, non-
self-extensional) logics: that is, the logical interderivability relation fails to be a
congruence of the formula algebra. Now, while S is also a non-congruential logic, its
implication connective (here denoted⇒) does satisfy the contraposition law: in fact
in S one has that (ϕ⇒ ψ)∧(ψ ⇒ ϕ) is a theorem if and only if (∼ϕ⇒ ∼ψ)∧(∼ψ ⇒
∼ϕ) is a theorem. In other words S, although non-congruential if we look at
its interderivability relation, enjoys at least ⇔-congruentiality in Humberstone’s
terminology (relative to the bi-implication ⇔ defined, in the usual way, as follows:
ϕ⇔ ψ := (ϕ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ ϕ))2.
Nelson’s original presentation of S has infinitely many schematic rules and no
algebraic semantics; [15] also leaves unclear whether N3 is comparable with S (and
if so, which of the two is stronger). Unlike its relatives N3 and N4, the logic S
received little attention after [15] and basic questions about it were left open, for
example: Is S algebraizable? Can S be finitely axiomatized? What are the exact
relations between S and N3, and between S and N4? In the present paper we will
use the modern techniques of algebraic logic to answer these questions.
Our study will follow the same lines of previous papers by M. Busaniche, R. Cig-
noli, S. Odintsov, M. Spinks and R. Veroff on (algebraic models of) N3 and N4
(see, e.g., [5, 6, 16, 19, 20]), which in turn rely on classic work by H. Rasiowa on
the algebraization of non-classical logics. These investigations have shown that the
algebraic approach to Nelson’s logics may be particularly insightful, as it allows to
view them as either conservative expansions of the negation-free fragment of intu-
itionistic logic by the addition of a new unary logical connective of strong negation
(∼) or as axiomatic extensions of well-known substructural/relevance logics. The
first perspective allows us to establish a particularly useful link between algebraic
models ofN3/N4 and models of intuitionistic logic (via the so-called twist-structure
construction — see especially [16]), while the second affords the possibility of ex-
ploiting general results and techniques that have been introduced in the study of
residuated structures; this is the approach of [19, 20] as well as [13], and that we
shall also take in the present paper (see especially Subsection 2.2).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present the propositional
fragment of the logic S and highlight some of its theorems, which will later be used
to establish its algebraizability. In Section 2 we prove that S is algebraizable and
present its equivalent algebraic semantics. In Section 3 we provide another calculus
for S, one that has a finite number of schematic axioms and only one schematic rule
(modus ponens). We point out that having only one rule makes it easy to prove the
Deduction Metatheorem in the standard way using induction over derivations. In
2Actually, we now know that N3 (and N4) are also ⇔-congruential for a suitable choice of
implication ⇒ (called strong implication) that can be defined using the weak one →; but Nelson
may well not have been aware of this while writing [15].
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Section 4 we prove that N3 is a proper axiomatic extension of S, and that S and
N4 are not extensions of each other. Proofs of some of the main new results are to
be found in an Appendix to this paper.
1. Nelson’s logic S
In this section we recall Nelson’s original presentation of the propositional frag-
ment of S [15] and we highlight some theorems of S that will be used further on to
establish its algebraizability.
As is now usual, here we take a sentential logic L to be a structure containing
a substitution-invariant consequence relation ⊢L defined over an algebra of formu-
las Fm freely generated by a denumerable set of propositional variables {p, q, r, . . .}
over a given language Σ. We will henceforth refer to algebras using boldface strings
(such as Fm and A), and use the corresponding italicized version of these same
strings (such as Fm and A) to refer to their corresponding carriers. Fixing a given
logic, we will use ϕ, ψ and γ, possibly decorated with subscripts, to refer to arbitrary
formulas of it.
Definition 1.1. Nelson’s logic S = 〈Fm,⊢S〉 is the sentential logic in the language
〈∧,∨,⇒,∼,⊥〉 of type 〈2, 2, 2, 1, 0〉 defined by the Hilbert-style calculus with the
schematic axioms and rules listed below. As usual, ϕ⇔ ψ will be used to abbreviate
(ϕ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ ϕ).
Axioms
(A1): ϕ⇒ ϕ
(A2): ⊥ ⇒ ϕ
(A3): ∼ϕ⇒ (ϕ⇒ ⊥)
(A4): ∼⊥
(A5): (ϕ⇒ ψ)⇔ (∼ψ ⇒ ∼ϕ)
Rules
Γ⇒ (ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ γ))
Γ⇒ (ψ ⇒ (ϕ⇒ γ))
(P)
ϕ⇒ (ϕ⇒ (ϕ⇒ γ))
ϕ⇒ (ϕ⇒ γ)
(C)
Γ⇒ ϕ ϕ⇒ γ
Γ⇒ γ
(E)
Γ⇒ ϕ ψ ⇒ γ
Γ⇒ ((ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ γ)
(⇒ l) γ
ϕ⇒ γ (⇒ r)
ϕ⇒ γ
(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ γ
(∧l1)
ψ ⇒ γ
(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ γ
(∧l2)
Γ⇒ ϕ Γ⇒ ψ
Γ⇒ (ϕ ∧ ψ)
(∧r)
ϕ⇒ γ ψ ⇒ γ
(ϕ ∨ ψ)⇒ γ
(∨l1)
ϕ⇒2 γ ψ ⇒2 γ
((ϕ ∨ ψ)⇒2 γ)
(∨l2)
Γ⇒ ϕ
Γ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(∨r1)
Γ⇒ ψ
Γ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(∨r2)
(ϕ ∧ ∼ψ)⇒ γ
∼(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ γ
(∼ ⇒ l)
Γ⇒2 (ϕ ∧ ∼ψ)
Γ⇒2 ∼(ϕ⇒ ψ)
(∼ ⇒ r)
(∼ϕ ∨ ∼ψ)⇒ γ
∼(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ γ
(∼ ∧ l)
Γ⇒ (∼ϕ ∨ ∼ψ)
Γ⇒ ∼(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(∼∧ r)
(∼ϕ ∧ ∼ψ)⇒ γ
∼(ϕ ∨ ψ)⇒ γ
(∼∨ l)
Γ⇒ (∼ϕ ∧ ∼ψ)
Γ⇒ ∼(ϕ ∨ ψ)
(∼ ∨ r)
ϕ⇒ γ
∼∼ϕ⇒ γ (∼∼l)
Γ⇒ ϕ
Γ⇒ ∼∼ϕ
(∼∼r)
In the above rules, following Nelson’s notation, Γ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn} is a finite
set of formulas and the following abbreviations are employed:
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Γ⇒ ϕ := ϕ1 ⇒ (ϕ2 ⇒ (. . .⇒ (ϕn ⇒ ϕ) . . .))
ϕ⇒2 ψ := ϕ⇒ (ϕ⇒ ψ)
Γ⇒2 ϕ := ϕ1 ⇒2 (ϕ2 ⇒2 (. . .⇒2 (ϕn ⇒2 ϕ) . . .))
Moreover, when Γ = ∅, we take Γ⇒ ϕ := ϕ.
Notice that we have fixed obvious infelicities in the rules (∧l2), (∧r) and (∼ ⇒ r)
as they appear in [15, pp.214–5]. For example, the original rule (∧l2) in Nelson’s
paper was:
(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ γ
ψ ⇒ γ
(∧l2)
This clearly makes the logic inconsistent. Indeed, taking ϕ = γ, we have:
(γ ∧ ψ)⇒ γ
ψ ⇒ γ
(∧l2)
Now, since (γ ∧ ψ) ⇒ γ is a theorem (see Prop. 1, below), ψ ⇒ γ is a theorem
too. Choosing ψ as an axiom, we would conclude thus that γ is a theorem for any
formula γ.
We note in passing that the rule (C), called weak condensation by Nelson, re-
places (and is indeed a weaker form of) the usual contraction rule:
ϕ⇒ (ϕ⇒ ψ)
ϕ⇒ ψ
Rule (C) is also known in the literature as 3-2 contraction [17, p. 389] and corre-
sponds, on algebraic models, to the property of three-potency (see Subsection 2.2).
Also, do note that we obtain modus ponens, (MP), by taking Γ = ∅ in rule (E):
ϕ ϕ⇒ γ
γ
It is worth noticing that, despite appearances, Nelson’s system S is a Hilbert-
style calculus, rather than a sequent system. Its underlying notion of derivation,
⊢S , is the usual one. Henceforth, for any logic L and any set of formulas Γ ∪ Π,
we shall write Γ ⊢L Π to say that Γ ⊢L pi for every pi ∈ Π. By Γ ⊣⊢L Π we will
abbreviate the double assertion Γ ⊢L Π and Π ⊢L Γ.
One of the crucial steps in proving that a logic is algebraizable (in the sense of
Blok and Pigozzi [3, Definition 2.2]) is to prove that it satisfies certain congruence
properties. In the present context, this entails checking that ϕ⇔ ψ ⊢S ∼ϕ⇔ ∼ψ
and {ϕ1 ⇔ ψ1, ϕ2 ⇔ ψ2} ⊢S (ϕ1•ϕ2)⇔ (ψ1•ψ2) for each connective • ∈ {∧,∨,⇒}.
The following auxiliary results will be used to prove that much, in the next section.
Proposition 1. The following formulas are theorems of S:
(1) (ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ ϕ
(2) (ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ ψ
(3) ϕ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(4) ψ ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(5) (ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ γ))⇔ (ψ ⇒ (ϕ⇒ γ))
Proof. All justifying derivations are straightforward. We detail the first item, as
an example:
ϕ⇒ ϕ (A1)
(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ ϕ
(∧l1)

ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS FOR NELSON’S LOGIC S 5
Proposition 2. {ϕ⇔ ψ} ⊣⊢S {ϕ⇒ ψ, ψ ⇒ ϕ}.
Proof. Such a logical equivalence is easily justified by Prop.1.1–2 and by considering
the rule (∧r) with Γ = ∅. 
2. S is algebraizable
In this section we prove that S is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi (it
is, in fact, implicative [8, Definition 2.3]), and we give two alternative presentations
for its equivalent algebraic semantics (to be called ‘S-algebras’). The first one is
obtained via the algorithm of [3, Theorem 2.17], while the second one is closer to
the usual axiomatizations of classes of residuated lattices, which are the algebraic
counterparts of many logics in the substructural family. As a particular advantage,
the second presentation of S-algebras will allow us to see at a glance that they form
an equational class, and will also make it easier to compare them with other known
classes of algebras for substructural logics.
Definition 2.1. An implicative logic is a sentential logic L whose underlying al-
gebra of formulas in a language Σ has a term α(p, q) in two variables that satisfies
the following conditions:
[IL1] ⊢L α(p, p)
[IL2] α(p, q), α(q, r) ⊢L α(p, r)
[IL3] p, α(p, q) ⊢L q
[IL4] q ⊢L α(p, q)
[IL5] for each n-ary • ∈ Σ,⋃n
i=1{α(pi, qi), α(qi, pi)} ⊢L α(•(p1, . . . , pn), •(q1, . . . , qn))
We call any such α an L-implication.
Given an algebra of formulas Fm of the language Σ, the associated set Fm ×
Fm of equations will henceforth be denoted by Eq; we will write ϕ ≈ ψ rather
than (ϕ, ψ) ∈ Eq. Let A be an algebra with the same similarity type as Fm.
A homomorphism V : Fm→ A is called a valuation in A. We say that a valuation V
in A satisfies ϕ ≈ ψ in A when V(ϕ) = V(ψ); we say that an algebra A satisfies
ϕ ≈ ψ when all valuations in A satisfy it.
Definition 2.2. A logic L is algebraizable if and only if there are equations E(ϕ) ⊆
Eq and a transform Eq
ρ
7−→ 2Fm, denoted by ∆(ϕ, ψ) := ρ(ϕ ≈ ψ), such that L
respects the following conditions:
[Alg] ϕ ⊣⊢L ∆(E(ϕ))
[Ref] ⊢L ∆(ϕ, ϕ)
[Sym] ∆(ϕ, ψ) ⊢L ∆(ψ, ϕ)
[Trans] ∆(ϕ, ψ) ∪∆(ψ, γ) ⊢L ∆(ϕ, γ)
[Cong] for each n-ary • ∈ Σ,⋃n
i=1∆(ϕi, ψi) ⊢L ∆(•(ϕ1, · · · , ϕn), •(ψ1, · · · , ψn))
We call any such E(ϕ) the set of defining equations and any such ∆(ϕ, ψ) the set
of equivalence formulas of L.
Clarifying the notation in [Alg], recall that the set E(ϕ) contains pairs of formulas
and we write ϕ ≈ ψ simply as syntactic sugar for a pair (ϕ, ψ) belonging to this
set. Now, ∆(ϕ, ψ) transforms an equation into a set of formulas. Accordingly, we
take ∆(E(ϕ)) as
⋃
{∆(ϕ1, ϕ2) | (ϕ1, ϕ2) ∈ E(ϕ)}. Similarly, we shall let E(∆(ϕ, ψ))
stand for
⋃
{E(χ) | χ ∈ ∆(ϕ, ψ)}.
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Definition 2.3. Let L be an implicative logic in the language Σ, having an L-im-
plication α. An L-algebra A is a Σ-algebra such that 1 ∈ A and:
[LALG1]: For all Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm and every valuation V in A,
if Γ ⊢L ϕ and V(Γ) ⊆ {1}, then V(ϕ) = 1.
[LALG2]: For all a, b ∈ A, if α(a, b) = 1 and α(b, a) = 1, then a = b.
The class of L-algebras is denoted by Alg∗L.
Every implicative logic L is algebraizable with respect to the class Alg∗L [8,
Proposition 3.15], and such algebraizability is witnessed by the defining equations
E(ϕ) := {ϕ ≈ α(ϕ, ϕ)} and the equivalence formulas ∆(ϕ, ψ) := {α(ϕ, ψ), α(ψ, ϕ)}.
These are in fact the sets of defining equations and of equivalence formulas that we
will use in the remainder of the present paper.
We can now prove (the details are to be found in the Appendix) that:
Theorem 2.4. The calculus ⊢S is implicative and thus algebraizable. The S-
implication is given by ⇒, that is, α(p, q) := p⇒ q.
In the case of S we have thus that E(ϕ) = {ϕ ≈ ϕ ⇒ ϕ} and ∆(ϕ, ψ) = {ϕ ⇒
ψ, ψ ⇒ ϕ}.
2.1. S-algebras. By Blok-Pigozzi’s algorithm ([3, Theorem 2.17], see also [8, Propo-
sition 3.44]), we know that the equivalent algebraic semantics of S is the class of
algebras given by Def. 2.5 below. We denote by Ax the set of axioms and denote
by Inf R the set the inference rules of S, given in Def. 1.1.
Definition 2.5. An S-algebra is a structure A = 〈A,∧,∨,⇒,∼, 0, 1〉 of type
〈2, 2, 2, 1, 0, 0〉 that satisfies the following equations and quasiequations:
(1) E(∆(ϕ, ϕ))
(2) E(∆(ϕ, ψ)) implies ϕ ≈ ψ
(3) E(ϕ), for each ϕ ∈ Ax
(4)
n⋃
i=1
E(γi) implies ϕ ≈ 1 for each γ1, · · · , γn ⊢S ϕ ∈ Inf R
Regarding the notation in the above definition, E(∆(ϕ, ϕ)) stands for the equation
ϕ ⇒ ϕ ≈ (ϕ ⇒ ϕ) ⇒ (ϕ ⇒ ϕ). Item 2 is the quasiequation: (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ≈ (ϕ ⇒
ψ) ⇒ (ϕ ⇒ ψ) and (ψ ⇒ ϕ) ≈ (ψ ⇒ ϕ) ⇒ (ψ ⇒ ϕ) implies ϕ ≈ ψ; E(ϕ) is the
equation ϕ ≈ ϕ⇒ ϕ for each axiom ϕ of S. In fact, these conditions are telling us
that for each axiom ϕ of S we have the equation ϕ ≈ 1, and for each rule ϕ ⊢S ψ of
S , in the corresponding algebras we have the quasiequation: if ϕ ≈ 1, then ψ ≈ 1.
We shall denote by E(An) the equation given in Def. 2.5.3 for the axiom An (for
1 ≤ n ≤ 5), and by Q(R) the quasiequation given in Def. 2.5.4 for the rule R of S.
From this point on, in this subsection, in order to make the propositions and their
proofs shorter, we shall also use the following abbreviations:
x ∗ y := ∼(x⇒ ∼y)
x2 := x ∗ x
xn := x ∗ (xn−1), for n > 2
The following result, whose proof may be found in the Appendix, will help us in
checking that the class of S-algebras forms a variety.
Proposition 3. Let A be an S-algebra and let a, b, c ∈ A. Then:
(1) a⇒ a = 1 = ∼0.
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(2) The relation ≤ defined by setting a ≤ b iff a ⇒ b = 1, is a partial order
with maximum 1 and minimum 0.
(3) a⇒ b = ∼b⇒ ∼a.
(4) a⇒ (b⇒ c) = b⇒ (a⇒ c).
(5) ∼∼a = a and a⇒ 0 = ∼a.
(6) 〈A, ∗, 1〉 is a commutative monoid.
(7) (a ∗ b)⇒ c = a⇒ (b⇒ c).
(8) The pair (∗,⇒) is residuated with respect to ≤, i.e., a∗b ≤ c iff b ≤ a⇒ c.
(9) a2 ≤ a3.
(10) 〈A,∧,∨〉 is a lattice with order ≤.
(11) (a ∨ b)2 ≤ a2 ∨ b2.
In the next section we introduce an equivalent presentation of S-algebras which
takes precisely the properties of Prop. 3 above as postulates.
2.2. Alternative presentation of S-algebras. We start here by recalling the
following standard definition [9, p.185]:
Definition 2.6. A commutative integral bounded residuated lattice (CIBRL) is an
algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 of type 〈2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0〉 such that:
(1) 〈A,∧,∨, 0, 1〉 is a bounded lattice with ordering ≤, minimum element 0 and
maximum element 1.
(2) 〈A, ∗, 1〉 is a commutative monoid.
(3) The pair (∗,⇒) is residuated with respect to ≤, i.e., a∗b ≤ c iff b ≤ a⇒ c.
In the context of the above definition, the integrality condition corresponds to
having 1 not only as a maximum but also as the multiplicative unit of the oper-
ation ∗, that is, x ∗ 1 = x. For a CIBRL this condition immediately follows from
Def. 2.6.1–2.
Setting ∼x := x ⇒ 0, we say that a residuated lattice is involutive [10, p.186]
when ∼∼a = a (in such a case, it follows that a ⇒ b = ∼b ⇒ ∼a). We say that
a residuated lattice is 3-potent when it satisfies the equation x2 ≤ x3. While we
have earlier defined ∗ from ⇒, and now ∗ is a primitive operation, we can show
that every CIBRL satisfies x ∗ y = ∼(x⇒ ∼y) (see [10, Lemma 5.1]).
Definition 2.7. An S ′-algebra is an involutive 3-potent CIBRL.
The proof of the following result may be found in the Appendix:
Lemma 2.8. (1) Any CIBRL satisfies the equation (x∨y)∗z ≈ (x∗z)∨(y∗z).
(2) Any CIBRL satisfies x2 ∨ y2 ≈ (x2 ∨ y2)2.
(3) Any 3-potent CIBRL satisfies (x ∨ y2)2 ≈ (x ∨ y)2.
(4) Any 3-potent CIBRL satisfies (x ∨ y)2 ≈ x2 ∨ y2.
Since involutive residuated lattices form an equational class [9, Theorem 2.7], it is
obvious that S ′-algebras are also an equational class. From Prop. 3, we immediately
conclude the following:
Proposition 4. Let A = 〈A,∧,∨,⇒,∼, 0, 1〉 be an S-algebra. Defining x ∗ y :=
∼(x⇒ ∼y), we have that A′ = 〈A,∧,∨, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 is an S ′-algebra.
Conversely, we are going to see that every S ′-algebra gives rise to an S-algebra by
checking that all (quasi) equations introduced in Definition 2.5 are satisfied (the
proof may be found in the Appendix):
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Proposition 5. Let A = 〈A,∧,∨, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 be an S ′-algebra. Defining ∼x :=
x⇒ 0, we have that A′ = 〈A,∧,∨,⇒,∼, 0, 1〉 is an S-algebra.
Thus, the classes of S-algebras and of S ′-algebras are term-equivalent.
The presentation given in Definition 2.7 has several advantages in what concerns
the study of the semantics of S. For example, it is now straightforward to check that
the three-element MV-algebra [7] is a model of Nelson’s logic S. This in turn allows
one to prove that the formulas which Nelson claims not to be derivable in S [15,
p.213] are indeed not valid (see [13]).
3. A finite Hilbert-style calculus for S
In this section we introduce a finite Hilbert-style calculus (which is an extension
of the calculus IPC∗\c, called intuitionistic logic without contraction, of [4]) that
is algebraizable with respect to the class of S ′-algebras.
We are thus going to have two logics that are both algebraizable with respect to
the same variety with the same defining equations and equivalence formulas; from
this we will obtain an equivalence between our calculus and Nelson’s.
The logic S ′ = 〈Fm,⊢S′〉 is the sentential logic in the language 〈∧,∨,⇒,
∗,∼,⊥,⊤〉 of type 〈2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 0, 0〉 defined by the Hilbert-style calculus with the
following schematic axioms and with modus ponens as the only rule:
(A1’) (ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ ((γ ⇒ ϕ)⇒ (γ ⇒ ψ))
(A2’) (ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ γ))⇒ (ψ⇒ (ϕ⇒ γ))
(A3’) ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ ϕ)
(A4’) (ϕ⇒ γ)⇒ ((ψ⇒ γ)⇒ ((ϕ ∨ ψ)⇒ γ))
(A5’) ϕ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(A6’) ψ ⇒ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(A7’) (ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ ϕ
(A8’) (ϕ ∧ ψ)⇒ ψ
(A9’) ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ (ϕ ∧ ψ))
(A10’) ((γ ⇒ ϕ) ∧ (γ ⇒ ψ))⇒ (γ ⇒ (ϕ ∧ ψ))
(A11’) ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ (ϕ ∗ ψ))
(A12’) (ϕ⇒ (ψ⇒ γ))⇒ ((ϕ ∗ ψ)⇒ γ)
(A13’) ∼ϕ⇒ (ϕ⇒ ψ)
(A14’) (ϕ⇒ ψ)⇔ (∼ψ ⇒ ∼ϕ)
(A15’) ϕ⇔ ∼∼ϕ
(A16’) ⊥ ⇒ ϕ
(A17’) ϕ⇒ ⊤
(A18’) ϕ2 ⇒ ϕ3
As before, ϕ ⇔ ψ abbreviates (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ ϕ), while the connective ∗ is here
taken as primitive.
Axioms (A1’)–(A13’), (A14’(⇒)) - (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (∼ψ ⇒ ∼ϕ), (A15’(⇒)) -
ϕ ⇒ ∼∼ϕ, (A16’) and (A17’) of our calculus are the same as those of IPC∗\c
as presented in [4, Table 3.2], where it is proven that IPC∗\c is algebraizable. We
added the converse implication in axioms (A14’) and (A15’) to characterize involu-
tion and we added the axiom (A18’) to characterize 3-potency. As algebraizability
is preserved by axiomatic extensions (cf. [8, Proposition 3.31]) we have the following
results:
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Theorem 3.1. The calculus S ′ is algebraizable (with the same defining equations
and equivalence formulas as S) with respect to the class of S ′-algebras.
Proof. We know from [4, Theorem 5.1] that IPC∗\c is algebraizable with respect to
the class of commutative integral bounded residuated lattices with the same defining
equations and equivalence formulas already considered above. The axioms that were
now added imply that the algebraic semantics of our extension is involutive and
3-potent, i.e., it is an S ′-algebra. 
Corollary 1. S and S ′ define the same logic.
Proof. Let KS be the class of S-algebras. Thanks to Prop. 4 and Prop. 5 we know
that KS is also the class of S ′-algebras. The result follows now from [8, Proposition
3.47], that gives us an algorithm to find a Hilbert-style calculus for an algebraizable
logic from its quasivariety, defining equations and equivalence formulas. As S-
algebras and S ′-algebras are the same class of algebras and their defining equations
and equivalence formulas are the same, the Hilbert-style calculus given by the
algorithm must do the same job as the one we had before. 
Working with Nelson’s original presentation of S, it can be hard to directly prove
some version of the Deduction Metatheorem. Indeed, if we prove it, as usual, by way
of an induction over the structure of the derivations, we need to apply the inductive
hypothesis over each rule of the system. The advantage of S ′, in employing such a
strategy, is that it has only one inference rule. This allows us to establish:
Theorem 3.2 (Deduction Metatheorem). If Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ψ, then Γ ⊢ ϕ2 ⇒ ψ.
Proof. Thanks to [9, Corollary 2.15] we have a version of the Deduction Metatheo-
rem for substructural logics wich says that Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ψ iff Γ ⊢ ϕn ⇒ ψ for some n.
In view of (A’18) it is easy to see that in S we can always choose n = 2. 
4. Comparing S with N3 and N4
As mentioned before, Nelson introduced two other better-known logics, N3 and
N4, which are also algebraizable with respect to classes of residuated structures
(namely, the so-called N3-lattices and N4-lattices). A question that immediately
arises concerns the precise relation between S and these other logics, or (equiva-
lently) between S-algebras and N3- and N4-lattices. In what follows it is worth
taking into account that not all S-algebras are distributive (see [13, Example 5.1]).
4.1. N4.
Definition 4.1. N4 = 〈Fm,⊢N4〉 is the sentential logic in the language 〈∧,∨,
→,∼〉 of type 〈2, 2, 2, 1〉 defined by the Hilbert-style calculus with the following
schematic axioms and modus ponens as the only schematic rule. Below, ϕ↔ ψ will
be used to abbreviate (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
(N1): ϕ→ (ψ → ϕ)
(N2): (ϕ→ (ψ → γ))→ ((ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ γ))
(N3): (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϕ
(N4): (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ψ
(N5): (ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ϕ→ γ)→ (ϕ→ (ψ ∧ γ)))
(N6): ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(N7): ψ → (ϕ ∨ ψ)
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(N8): (ϕ→ γ)→ ((ψ → γ)→ ((ϕ ∨ ψ)→ γ))
(N9): ∼∼ϕ↔ ϕ
(N10): ∼(ϕ ∨ ψ)↔ (∼ϕ ∧ ∼ψ)
(N11): ∼(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ (∼ϕ ∨ ∼ψ)
(N12): ∼(ϕ→ ψ)↔ (ϕ ∧∼ψ)
The implication → in N4 is usually called weak implication, in contrast to the
strong implication ⇒ that is defined in N4 as follows:
ϕ⇒ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (∼ψ → ∼ϕ).
As the notation suggests, it is the strong implication that we shall compare with
the implication of S. This appears indeed to be the most meaningful choice, for
otherwise, since the weak implications of both N4 and N3 fail to satisfy contrapo-
sition (which holds in S), we would have to say that S is incomparable with both
logics.
The logicN4 is algebraizable (though not implicative) with equivalence formulas
{ϕ⇒ ψ, ψ ⇒ ϕ} and defining equation ϕ ≈ ϕ→ ϕ [18, Theorem 2.6]. We notice in
passing that the implication in this defining equation could as well be taken to be
the strong one, so ϕ ≈ ϕ⇒ ϕ would work too; in contrast, {ϕ→ ψ, ψ → ϕ} would
not be a set of equivalence formulas, due precisely to the failure of contraposition.
The equivalent algebraic semantics of N4 is the class of N4-lattices defined below
[16, Definition 8.4.1]:
Definition 4.2. An algebra A = 〈A,∨,∧,→,∼〉 is an N4-lattice if it satisfies the
following properties:
1: 〈A,∨,∧,∼〉 is a De Morgan algebra.
2: The relation  defined, for all a, b ∈ A, by a  b iff (a → b) → (a → b) =
(a→ b) is a pre-order on A.
3: The relation ≡ defined, for all a, b ∈ A as a ≡ b iff a  b and b  a
is a congruence relation with respect to ∧,∨,→ and the quotient algebra
A⊲⊳ := 〈A,∨,∧,→〉/≡ is an implicative lattice.
4: For any a, b ∈ A, ∼(a→ b) ≡ a ∧ ∼b.
5: For any a, b ∈ A, a ≤ b iff a  b and ∼b  ∼a, where ≤ is the lattice order
for A.
A very simple example of an N4-lattice is the four-element algebra A4 whose
lattice reduct is the four-element diamond De Morgan algebra. This algebra has
carrier A4 = {0, 1, b, n}, the maximum element of the lattice order being 1, the
minimum 0, and b and n being incomparable. The negation (Fig 1) is given by
∼b := b, ∼n := n, ∼1 := 0 and ∼0 := 1. The weak implication is given, for all
a ∈ A4, by 1 → a = b → a := a and 0 → a = n → a := 1. One can check that
A4 satisfies all properties of Definition 4.2 (in particular, the quotient A4/≡ is the
two-element Boolean algebra).
Proposition 6. N4 and S are incomparable, that is, neither of them extends the
other.
Proof. We show that not every S-algebra is an N4-lattice, and that no N4-lattice
is an S-algebra. The first claim follows from the fact that N4-lattices have a
distributive lattice reduct, whereas S-algebras need not be distributive. As to the
second, it is sufficient to observe that the equation x ⇒ x ≈ y ⇒ y is satisfied
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in all S-algebras but does not hold in the four-element N4-lattice A4. There we
have 1 ⇒ 1 6= b ⇒ b because 1 ⇒ 1 = (1 → 1) ∧ (∼1 → ∼1) = 1 ∧ 1 = 1 but
b⇒ b = (b→ b) ∧ (∼b→ ∼b) = b ∧ b = b. Since both N4 and S are algebraizable
logics, this immediately entails that neither N4 ≤ S nor S ≤ N4. In logical terms,
one can check that the distributivity axiom is valid in N4 but not in S, whereas
the formula (ϕ⇒ ϕ)⇒ (ψ ⇒ ψ) is valid in S but not in N4.
→ 0 n b 1
0 1 1 1 1
n 1 1 1 1
b 0 n b 1
1 0 n b 1
∼
0 1
n n
b b
1 1
1
n b
0
Figure 1. A4

4.2. N3.
Definition 4.3. Nelson’s logic N3 = 〈Fm,⊢N3〉 is the axiomatic extension of N4
obtained by adding the following axiom:
(N13): ∼ϕ→ (ϕ→ ψ).
Proposition 7. N3 is a proper extension of S.
Proof. It is known from [19] that every N3-lattice (the algebraic counterpart of
N3) satisfies all properties of our Definition 2.7, and therefore every N3-lattice
is an S-algebra. On the other hand, the logic N3 was defined as an axiomatic
extension of N4, therefore it is distributive too, whereas S-algebras need not be
distributive (see [13, Example 5.1]). 
5. Future Work
We have studied S in two directions, through a proof-theoretic approach and
through algebraic methods. Concerning the proof-theoretic approach, we have in-
troduced a finite Hilbert-style calculus for S. An interesting question that still
remains is about other types of calculi. In this sense we would find it attractive to
be able to present a sequent calculus for S enjoying a cut-elimination theorem, so
that it could be used to determine, among other things, whether S is decidable and
enjoys the Craig interpolation theorem.
As observed in Theorem 3.2, if we let ϕ → ψ := ϕ ⇒ (ϕ ⇒ ψ), then the weak
implication → enjoys a version of the Deduction Metatheorem; this suggests that
the connective→ has a special logical role within S, whereas⇒ is the key operation
on the corresponding algebras. It is well known that the logic N3 as well as its
algebraic counterpart can be equivalently axiomatized by taking either the weak
or the strong implication as primitive, defining → from ⇒ as shown above. The
analogous result for N4 has been harder to prove (see [20]), and the corresponding
definition is ϕ → ψ := (ϕ ∧ (((ϕ ∧ (ψ ⇒ ψ)) ⇒ ψ) ⇒ ((ϕ ∧ (ψ ⇒ ψ)) ⇒ ψ))) ⇒
((ϕ ∧ (ψ ⇒ ψ))⇒ ψ).
We can ask a similar question about the logic S and its algebraic counterpart:
namely, given that Nelson’s axiomatization as well as ours have ⇒ as primitive,
is it also possible to axiomatize S(-algebras) by taking the weak implication →
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as primitive? This question is related to certain algebraic properties that → en-
joys on S-algebras. In fact, we have shown in [13, Theorem 4.5] that, analo-
gously to N3-lattices, S-algebras are a variety of weak Brouwerian semilattices with
filter-preserving operations [2, Definition 2.1], which means that they possess an
intuitionistic-like internal structure, where a weak relative pseudo-complementation
operation (an intuitionistic-like implication) is given precisely by the weak implica-
tion. This suggests that one may in fact hope to be able to view (and axiomatize)
S as a conservative expansion of some intuitionistic-like positive logic by a strong
(involutive) negation, as has been the case of N3 and N4.
As hinted above, a more detailed study of S-algebras can be found in the compan-
ion paper [13]. Some questions regarding the variety of S-algebras, its extensions,
congruences and more relations between S-algebras and other well-known algebras
are investigated there. Another question that is still open is which logic (class of
algebras) is the infimum of S(-algebras) and N4(-lattices) — it is easy to see that
the least logic extending S and N4 is precisely N3.
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Appendix: Proofs of the some of the main results
Theorem 2.4. The calculus ⊢S is implicative, and thus algebraizable.
Proof. In the case of S, the term α(ϕ, ψ) may be chosen to be ϕ ⇒ ψ. We will
make below free use of Prop. 2.
[IL1] follows immediately from axiom (A1), while [IL2] follows from rule (E).
[IL3] follows from (MP) and [IL4] follows from (⇒ r). We are left with proving that
⇒ respects [IL5] for each connective • ∈ {∧,∨,⇒,∼}.
(∼): {(ϕ ⇔ ψ), (ψ ⇔ ϕ)} ⊢S ∼ϕ ⇔ ∼ψ holds by axiom (A5) and the (de-
rived) rule (MP).
(∧): We must prove that {(ϕ1 ⇔ ψ1), (ϕ2 ⇔ ψ2)} ⊢S (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)⇔ (ψ1 ∧ ψ2).
From Proposition 1.1–2 we have ⊢S (ϕ1∧ϕ2)⇒ ϕ1 and ⊢S (ϕ1∧ϕ2)⇒ ϕ2.
Then:
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)⇒ ϕ1 ϕ1 ⇒ ψ1
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)⇒ ψ1
(E)
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)⇒ ϕ2 ϕ2 ⇒ ψ2
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)⇒ ψ2
(E)
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)⇒ (ψ1 ∧ ψ2)
(∧r)
The remainder of the proof is analogous.
(∨): We must prove that {(ϕ1 ⇔ ψ1), (ϕ2 ⇔ ψ2)} ⊢S (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)⇔ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2).
From Proposition 1.3–4, ψ1 ⇒ (ψ1 ∨ψ2) and ψ2 ⇒ (ψ1 ∨ψ2) are derivable.
Then:
ϕ1 ⇒ ψ1 ψ1 ⇒ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)
ϕ1 ⇒ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)
(E)
ϕ2 ⇒ ψ2 ψ2 ⇒ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)
ϕ2 ⇒ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)
(E)
(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)⇒ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)
(∨l1)
The remainder of the proof is analogous.
(⇒): We must prove that {(θ ⇔ ϕ), (ψ ⇔ γ)} ⊢S (θ ⇒ ψ) ⇔ (ϕ ⇒ γ). This
time, we have:
ϕ⇒ θ ψ ⇒ γ
ϕ⇒ ((θ ⇒ ψ)⇒ γ)
(⇒ l)
Taking ψ as θ ⇒ ψ in Prop. 1.5, we have:
ϕ⇒ ((θ ⇒ ψ)⇒ γ) (ϕ⇒ ((θ ⇒ ψ)⇒ γ))⇒ ((θ ⇒ ψ)⇒ (ϕ⇒ γ))
(θ ⇒ ψ)⇒ (ϕ⇒ γ)
(MP)
The remainder of the proof is analogous.

Proposition 3. Let A be an S-algebra and let a, b, c ∈ A. Then:
(1) a⇒ a = 1 = ∼0.
(2) The relation ≤ defined by setting a ≤ b iff a ⇒ b = 1, is a partial order
with maximum 1 and minimum 0.
(3) a⇒ b = ∼b⇒ ∼a.
(4) a⇒ (b⇒ c) = b⇒ (a⇒ c).
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(5) ∼∼a = a and a⇒ 0 = ∼a.
(6) 〈A, ∗, 1〉 is a commutative monoid.
(7) (a ∗ b)⇒ c = a⇒ (b⇒ c).
(8) The pair (∗,⇒) is residuated with respect to ≤, i.e., a∗b ≤ c iff b ≤ a⇒ c.
(9) a2 ≤ a3.
(10) 〈A,∧,∨〉 is a lattice with order ≤.
(11) (a ∨ b)2 ≤ a2 ∨ b2.
Proof. (1) This follows from the fact that S is an implicative logic, see [8,
Lemma 2.6]. In particular, ∼0 = 0⇒ 0 = 1.
(2) By E(A2) we have that 0 is the minimum element with respect to the order
≤. The rest easily follows from the fact that S is implicative.
(3) This follows from E(A5) and item 2 above.
(4) By Q(P) and item 2 above, we have that d ≤ a ⇒ (b ⇒ c) implies d ≤
b ⇒ (a ⇒ c) for all d ∈ A. Then, taking d = a ⇒ (b ⇒ c), we have
a⇒ (b⇒ c) ≤ b⇒ (a⇒ c), which easily implies the desired result.
(5) The identity ∼∼a = a follows from item 2 above together with Q(∼∼l) and
Q(∼∼r). By item 3 above, a ⇒ 0 = ∼0 ⇒ ∼a = 1 ⇒ ∼a = ∼a. The last
identity holds good because, on the one hand, by Q(⇒ l) we have that 1 ≤ 1
and ∼a ≤ ∼a implies 1⇒ ∼a ≤ ∼a. On the other hand, by item 1 we have
∼a⇒ ∼a ≤ 1 and so we can apply Q(⇒ r) to obtain 1⇒ (∼a⇒ ∼a) = 1.
By item 4, we have 1⇒ (∼a⇒ ∼a) = ∼a⇒ (1⇒ ∼a), hence we conclude
that ∼a⇒ (1⇒ ∼a) = 1 and so, by item 2, ∼a ≤ 1⇒ ∼a.
(6) As to commutativity, using items 3 and 5 above, we have a ∗ b = ∼(a ⇒
∼b) = ∼(∼∼b ⇒ ∼a) = ∼(b ⇒ ∼a) = b ∗ a. As to associativity, using
3, 5, Q(∼∼r) and Q(∼∼l), we have (a ∗ b) ∗ c = ∼(∼(a ⇒ ∼b) ⇒ ∼c) =
∼(∼∼c ⇒ ∼∼(a ⇒ ∼b) = ∼(c ⇒ (a ⇒ ∼b)) = ∼(a ⇒ (c ⇒ ∼b)) =
∼(a ⇒ (b ⇒ ∼c)) = ∼(a ⇒ ∼∼(b ⇒ ∼c)) = a ∗ (b ∗ c). As to 1 being
the neutral element, using items 1 and 5 above, we have a ∗ 1 = a ∗ ∼0 =
∼(a⇒ ∼∼0) = ∼(a⇒ 0) = ∼∼a = a.
(7) Using items 2, 3, 5 and 6 above, we have (a ∗ b)⇒ c = ∼(a ⇒ ∼b)⇒ c =
∼c ⇒ ∼∼(a ⇒ ∼b) = ∼c ⇒ (a ⇒ ∼b) = a ⇒ (∼c ⇒ ∼b) = a ⇒ (∼∼b ⇒
∼∼c) = a⇒ (b⇒ c).
(8) By item 2 above, we have a ∗ b ≤ c iff (a ∗ b) ⇒ c = 1 iff, by item 7,
a⇒ (b⇒ c) = 1 iff, by item 6, b⇒ (a⇒ c) = 1 iff, by 2 again, b ≤ a⇒ c.
(9) By Q(C) we have that a3 ≤ c implies a2 ≤ c for all c ∈ A. Then, taking
c = a3, we have a2 ≤ a3.
(10) We check that a∧ b is the infimum of the set {a, b} with respect to ≤. First
of all, we have a ∧ b ≤ a and a ∧ b ≤ b by Q(∧l1), Q(∧l2) and item 2
above. Then, assuming c ≤ a and c ≤ b, we have c ≤ a ∧ b by Q(∧r). An
analogous reasoning, using Q(∨r1), Q(∨r2) and Q(∨l1) shows that a∨ b is
the supremum of {a, b}.
(11) By item 10 we have that a2 ≤ a2 ∨ b2 and b2 ≤ a2 ∨ b2. Hence, by item 8,
we have a ≤ a⇒ (a2 ∨ b2) and b ≤ b⇒ (a2 ∨ b2). By item 2 we have then
a ⇒ (a ⇒ (a2 ∨ b2)) = b ⇒ (b ⇒ (a2 ∨ b2)) = 1, hence we can use Q(∨l2)
to obtain (a ∨ b)⇒ ((a ∨ b)⇒ (a2 ∨ b2)) = 1. Then items 2 and 8 give us
(a ∨ b)2 ≤ a2 ∨ b2, as was to be proved.
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
Lemma 2.8.
(1) Any CIBRL satisfies the equation (x ∨ y) ∗ z ≈ (x ∗ z) ∨ (y ∗ z).
(2) Any 3-potent CIBRL satisfies x2 ∨ y2 ≈ (x2 ∨ y2)2.
(3) Any 3-potent CIBRL satisfies (x ∨ y2)2 ≈ (x ∨ y)2.
(4) Any 3-potent CIBRL satisfies (x ∨ y)2 ≈ x2 ∨ y2.
Proof. (1) See [9, Lemma 2.6].
(2) Let a, b be arbitrary elements of a given 3-potent CIBRL. From a2 ≤ (a2 ∨
b2) and b2 ≤ (a2 ∨ b2), using monotonicity of ∗, we have a4 ≤ (a2 ∨ b2)2
and b4 ≤ (a2 ∨ b2)2. Using 3-potency, the latter inequalities simplify to
a2 ≤ (a2 ∨ b2)2 and b2 ≤ (a2 ∨ b2)2. Thus, a2 ∨ b2 ≤ (a2 ∨ b2)2.
(3) We have a∨b2 ≤ a∨b from monotonicity of ∗ and supremum of ∨, therefore
(a ∨ b2)2 ≤ (a ∨ b)2. For the converse, we have that a ∗ b ≤ a, whence
a ∗ b ≤ a ∨ b2. Also a2 ≤ a ∨ b2 and b2 ≤ a ∨ b2. By supremum of ∨,
a2 ∨ (a ∗ b) ∨ b2 ≤ a ∨ b2. But a2 ∨ (a ∗ b) ∨ b2 = (a ∨ b)2 by Lemma 2.8.1,
so (a ∨ b)2 ≤ a ∨ b2. Using the monotonicity of ∗, (a ∨ b)4 ≤ (a ∨ b2)2 and
from 3-potency we have (a ∨ b)2 ≤ (a ∨ b2)2.
(4) From Lemma 2.8.2 we have a2 ∨ b2 = (a2 ∨ b2)2, and from Lemma 2.8.3 we
have (a2 ∨ b2)2 = (a2 ∨ b)2 = (b ∨ a2)2 = (b ∨ a)2.

Proposition 5. Let A = 〈A,∧,∨, ∗,⇒, 0, 1〉 be an S ′-algebra. Defining ∼x :=
x⇒ 0, we have that A′ = 〈A,∧,∨,⇒,∼, 0, 1〉 is an S-algebra.
Proof. Let A be an S ′-algebra. We first consider the equations corresponding to
the axioms of S. As a ≤ b iff a ⇒ b = 1, we will write the former rather than the
latter.
Equations
The equation E(A1) easily follows from integrality. We have E(A2) from the fact
that 0 is the minimum element of A. From the definition of ∼ in S ′ and from
E(A1) we see that E(A3) holds. We know that 1 := ∼0, therefore we have E(A4).
As A is involutive, it follows that E(A5) holds. We are still to prove the equation
E(∆(ϕ, ϕ)). For that, see that we need to prove the identity (ϕ⇒ ϕ)∧(ϕ⇒ ϕ) = 1,
and we already know that ϕ⇒ ϕ = 1, therefore also (ϕ⇒ ϕ) ∧ (ϕ⇒ ϕ) = 1.
quasiequations
Q(P) follows from the commutativity of ∗ and from the identity (a ∗ b)⇒ c = a⇒
(b ⇒ c). Q(C) follows from 3-potency: since a2 ≤ a3, we have that a3 ⇒ b = 1
implies a2 ⇒ b = 1.
Q(E) follows from the fact that A has a partial order ≤ that is determined by the
implication ⇒. To prove Q(⇒ l), suppose a ≤ b and c ≤ d. From c ≤ d, as
b ⇒ c ≤ b ⇒ c, using residuation we have that b ∗ (b ⇒ c) ≤ c ≤ d, therefore
b ∗ (b⇒ c) ≤ d and therefore b⇒ c ≤ b⇒ d. Note that as a ≤ b, using residuation
we have that a ∗ (b ⇒ d) ≤ b ∗ (b ⇒ d) ≤ d, therefore b ⇒ d ≤ a ⇒ d and then
b⇒ c ≤ a⇒ d. Now, since b⇒ c ≤ a ⇒ d iff a ∗ (b ⇒ c) ≤ d iff a ≤ (b ⇒ c)⇒ d,
we obtain thus the desired result.
For Q(⇒ r) we need to prove that if d = 1, then b⇒ d = 1. This follows immedi-
ately from integrality.
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quasiequationsQ(∧l1), Q(∧l2), Q(∧r), Q(∨l1), Q(∨r1) andQ(∨r2) follow straight-
forwardly from the fact that A is partially ordered and the order is determined by
the implication.
In order to prove Q(∨l2), notice that (b ∨ c)2 ≤ b2 ∨ c2 by Lemma 2.8.4. Sup-
pose b2 ≤ d and c2 ≤ d, then since A is a lattice, we have b2 ∨ c2 ≤ d and as
(b ∨ c)2 ≤ b2 ∨ c2 we conclude that (b ∨ c)2 ≤ d and thus (b ∨ c)2 ⇒ d = 1.
As to Q(∼ ⇒ l), by integrality we have b ∗ c ≤ b and b ∗ c ≤ c. Thus b ∗ c ≤ b ∧ c.
Now, if b ∧ c ≤ d, then b ∗ c ≤ d.
In order to prove Q(∼ ⇒ r), suppose d2 ≤ b ∧ c. Using monotonicity of ∗, we have
d2 ∗ d2 ≤ (b ∧ c) ∗ (b ∧ c), i.e., d4 ≤ (b ∧ c)2. Using 3-potency, we have d4 = d2,
therefore d2 ≤ (b ∧ c)2. Since (b ∧ c)2 ≤ b ∗ c, we have d2 ≤ (b ∧ c)2 ≤ b ∗ c, i.e.,
d2 ≤ b ∗ c.
Q(∼ ∧ l), Q(∼ ∧ r), Q(∼ ∨ l) and Q(∼ ∨ l) follow from the De Morgan’s Laws
(cf. [9, Lemma 3.17]).
Finally, we have Q(∼∼l) and Q(∼∼r) from A being involutive.
It remains to be proven that the quasiequation E(∆(ϕ, ψ)) implies ϕ ≈ ψ, that is,
if ϕ ⇒ ψ = 1 and ψ ⇒ ϕ = 1, then ϕ = ψ. As 1 is the maximum of the algebra,
we have that ϕ⇒ ψ = 1 and ψ ⇒ ϕ = 1, therefore ϕ ≤ ψ and ψ ≤ ϕ. As ≤ is an
order relation, it follows that ϕ = ψ. 
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